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The on-going crisis in Syria helps Responsibility to Protect (R2P) analysts identify what 
evidence scholars and policymakers base judgements of a ‘manifest failing’ on. This is 
particularly relevant as the multifaceted crisis in Syria underlines the complexity and confusion 
that scholars and policymakers face when analysing overlap between atrocity c imes and armed 
conflict. The article draws on interdisciplinary research into mass violence in order to put 
forward five key indicators of a ‘manifest failing’ and applies them to Syria: i) government 
intentions, ii) weapons used, iii) death toll, iv) number of people displaced, an  v) the 
intentional targeting of civilians, especially women, children and the elderly. In so doing, the 
article contributes to an emerging research agenda which may aid policymakers and scholars in 
their assessment of a ‘manifest failing’ but also has scope for helping those outside government 
to hold decision makers to account by creating a framework against which political [in]action 
can be judged. 
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‘Research on the concept of manifest failure and its relationship to R2P is relatively new, even within the 
burgeoning literature that now exists on R2P itself’.2 
 
Paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) stipulates that the 
international community has a responsibility to act in a ‘timely and decisive’ manner when 
‘national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations’ from genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.3 But what constitutes a ‘manifest 
failing? The phrase was introduced in the final drafting stage of the WSOD in order to 
replace the terminology ‘unable or unwilling’, but the WSOD offers little to guide decision 
makers in determining when a state is ‘manifestly failing’. Although 2015 will mark the tenth 
anniversary of the WSOD, the above statement begins to highlight that despite the abundance 
of literature produced on the Responsibility to Protect, the concept of ‘manifest failure’ 
remains overlooked and under researched.4 It may be claimed that the phrase is so transparent 
that there is no need for clarity; after all, the word manifest means ‘evident to the eye, mind, 
or judgement; obvious’.5 But when this understanding is applied to the assessment of whether 
a host state is ‘manifestly failing’ to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, what evidence is required? If it is the case that proof 
of one of the four crimes being carried out is enough to warrant a pillar three response, then 
the requirement of a ‘manifest failing’ would not be needed. Moreover, from a legal 
perspective, the killing of just one person or a small group of people, for example a group of 
hostages, could constitute genocide, but this would not mean that the host state has 
‘manifestly failed’ in its R2P.6 It is important therefore to consider that the most controversial 
pillar of the R2P (which includes wide range of non-coercive response measures under 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter as well as coercive measures under Chapter VII7) is 
grounded, in part, on an ambiguous phrase.  
The question of what constitutes a ‘manifest failing’ feeds into an important debate 
regarding ‘which humanitarian crises justify international moral action and which do not?’8 
Despite the fact that the WSOD focuses on just four crimes, Robert Pape analyses twenty-
three examples of mass atrocity crimes since 1990 and claims that the current R2P framework 
would demand an intervention in all of them, which, for Pape, sets the bar too low.9 At the 
same time, he argues that only intervening to prevent genocide would set the bar too high 
with an intervention in just three cases.10 As a result he sets out a ‘pragmatic humanitarian 
intervention approach’ based on three requirements (discussed below) as an alternative which 
would have called for intervention in seven of the twenty-three cases analysed.11 Whilst this 
author is sympathetic to Pape’s middle-ground position, it seems he has not considered that 
the requirement of a ‘manifest failing’ (a phrase which he never uses12) introduced a 
pragmatic element into the R2P which, even if one accepts his logic, renders his new 
approach redundant. Yes, legitimate questions need to be considered concerning whether a 
small scale example of an R2P crime could occur without a ‘manifest failing’ taking place: 
‘[w]hat kind of war crime?’ and ‘[w]hat kind of ethnic cleansing?’ requires international 
action.13 The problem is that in failing to address the issue of a ‘manifest failing’, Pape fails 
to acknowledge that his line of enquiry can be factored into the current R2P framework.14  
It is important to answer two questions at the outset. First, why focus on Syria? In 
many ways, Syria defines the counter-position to this article in that scholars may simply 
claim that it is obvious that the regime has failed in its R2P. Mike Abramowitz captures this 
sentiment when he states, ‘[t]here is no question that Syria today represents perhaps the most 
glaring failure to protect civilians from the worst, an R2P failure of the first order; with 
100,000 deaths and clear cases of massacres and other crimes against humanity’.15 Although 
this author does not disagree with this statement, the focus on death toll, which takes centre 
stage in mainstream media analysis, is just one indicator of a ‘manifest failing’ and it is 
important that scholars provide a more informed understanding by analysing the complexities 
involved. In addition to this it is important to note that this article does not aim to imply that 
there have been explicit UN Security Council debates over whether the Syrian regime is 
‘manifestly failing’. The point here is that it is important to learn lessons from this ‘R2P 
failure of the fist order’. A part of this should be that the crisis helps us to identify what 
evidence we base judgements of a ‘manifest failing’ on. More importantly, it highlights the 
need to get to grips with the confusion and chaos that academics and policymakers face when 
analysing the issue of a ‘manifest failing’ within the context of warfare.16 This is a key 
component highlighted in the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s fifth report on R2P 
(since 2009) as he highlights the need to navigate the ‘overlap’ between ‘armed conflict’ and 
‘atrocity crimes’.17 
The second question is: why choose these five indicators? As will be demonstrated 
throughout this paper, the indicators are drawn from interdisciplinary research into mass 
violence. Although there is much disagreement on the causes of crimes such as genocide, the 
question of what constitutes a ‘manifest failing’ is a qualitatively different task and it is 
important to separate these two lines of enquiry. Against this backdrop, the article identifies 
five key indicators: i) government intentions, ii) weapons used, iii) death toll, iv) number of 
people displaced, and v) the intentional targeting of civilians, especially women, children and 
the elderly. The aim here is not to create the ‘Holy Grail’ framework that policymakers and 
scholars will turn to immediately. Instead, the intention is to provide a ‘common reference 
within which argumentation can take place’ for at present there is none.18 Let us remember 
that the identification of between three and seven criteria (this has changed over time) has 
been used to guide assessments of what constitutes a Just War from St. Aquinas to present 
day.19  
The article is structured in six parts. The first section explains the current UN 
approach to highlight its strengths and weaknesses and ultimately argues that indicators are 
needed. The analysis then shifts its attention to focus on Syria with one section devoted to 
each of the five indicators identified above. The conclusion draws the main points together 
whilst raising further issues and questions that need to be addressed as this research agenda 
continues to grow. 
 
The UN approach 
Paragraph 139 of the WSOD sets out the following commitment which highlights that a wide 
range of coercive and non-coercive measures are available to the UN under Chapters VI, VII 
and VIII as it responds in a ‘timely and decisive manner’ on a ‘case-by-case basis’ should a 
national authority ‘manifestly fail’ in its R2P: 
 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chap ers VI 
and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared, to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner through the Security Council in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national 
authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.20 
 
The key aspect to consider is that the ambiguity that surrounds a ‘manifest failing’ goes hand 
in hand with the ‘case-by-case’ approach and together these have two significant strengths.  
 The first is the ambiguous nature of the phrase ‘manifest failing’ itself. To put this in 
context let us consider the UN Charter. As Paul Kennedy, and indeed many others have 
highlighted, the Charter was intentionally designed using ‘language that was adaptable 
enough to allow application under unforeseen circumstances in years to come’.21 In other 
words, if guidelines are too rigid, then ultimately this hinders rather than helps the application 
of policies. Against the backdrop of the League of Nations Covenant, flexibility was seen to 
be a key component of constructing a more durable system of governance at the international 
level. Thus, it could be argued that ‘manifest failing’ is another example of artful language 
which enables the UN to respond on a ‘case-by-case’ basis – this is its second strength - in 
that it is widely accepted that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.22 Quite simply, mass 
atrocity crimes are far too complex for any single framework to provide a solution. For 
example, the debates over the causes of genocide alone highlight that no one approach can 
provide the silver bullet.23 Indeed, in the recent assessment of Syria, Samantha Power, the US 
Ambassador to the UN stated, ‘there is no one size fits all solution, no algorithm, nor should 
there be.’24 In so doing, Power re-stated the sentiment expressed by the UN Secretary-General 
in that trying to establish a single framework would be both a mistake and counterproductive. 
Although this UN perspective is the dominant view found in the discourse, there are a 
number of issues that need to be thought through. First, any attempt to create a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach is flawed but is important to differentiate between the interpretation of the R2P 
and the application of it. Following the intervention in Libya and the non-intervention in 
Syria, Alex Bellamy rightly points out, ‘[t]here are two issues that are often raised in relation 
to this problem: consistency in the application and implementation of the RtoP and 
consistency in interpretation of the concept’.25 To be clear, this article engages with the latter 
and does not set out to answer questions of application, such as, how should the UN respond 
the crisis in Syria? This author’s position is that the response of the international community 
should differ on a case-by-case basis, after all, ‘foreign policy must always operate within 
what Edmund Burke termed “the empire of circumstances”’.26 But in order to help the 
sustainability of the R2P in the 21st century our interpretation of the concept should be 
consistent. A part of this has to be, raising awareness of, and addressing the issues that 
surround, a ‘manifest failing’. This gives weight to the idea that indicators may help aid 
decision makers in making their assessment of a ‘manifest failing’ thus improving the ability 
of the UN to fulfil its own commitment to respond in a ‘timely and decisive’ manner. It is 
important therefore to understand that establishing indicators compliments the UN approach. 
The intention here is not dismiss or downplay the need for flexibility but instead to 
draw attention to one aspect that has not been raised in the discourse as ambiguity aids 
flexibility but this also serves great power manipulation. This was famously played out in the 
context of the Rwandan genocide as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council 
(P5) avoided using the word genocide to distance themselves from the responsibilities set out 
in the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.27 This is not to say that the actors involved manipulated the ambiguity inherent in 
the Genocide Convention but simply to draw attention to the idea that words matter. For 
example, in relation to Libya it has been argued that Conservatives in the Canadian 
government banned the use of the phrase R2P even though they supported the intervention so 
as not to set a precedent for the future (which some have claimed is broadly in line with the 
Western position).28 More recently, regarding Syria, it has been argued that the U.S., used 
‘vague rhetoric’ as part of a concerted White House effort to avoid taking a clear position on 
U.S. policy toward Syria’s 2-year old civil war’.29 When one considers the ambiguity that 
surrounds the phrase ‘manifest failing’ on one hand and the fact that so little attention is paid 
to it on the other, this facilitates the ability of states to distance themselves from their 
responsibilities. Thus, the hope is that this emerging research agenda may in time help those 
outside government to hold decision makers to account by creating a framework against 
which political [in]action can be judged. At the very least, and to return to Pape, an 
awareness of the issue is needed. For example, a senior peace-keeping official at the UN 
admitted that it was only after the Rwandan genocide had taken place that he found out that 
the Genocide Convention existed.30 This raises the idea that it is difficult to even know the 
implications that stem from narratives that are constructed both consciously and 
unconsciously.31  
A final point is that even on a case-by case basis states will have to appeal to 
something in order to make the case that a threshold has been passed. To put this into context 
let us consider President Barack Obama’s justification for the intervention in Libya in 2011: 
 
In the face of the world’s condemnation, Qaddafi chose to escalate his attacks, launching a 
military campaign against the Libyan people.  Innocent people were targeted for killing. 
Hospitals and ambulances were attacked.  Journalists were arrested, sexually assaulted, and 
killed.  Supplies of food and fuel were choked off.  Water for hundreds of thousands of people 
in Misurata was shut off.  Cities and towns were shelled, mosques were destroyed, and 
apartment buildings reduced to rubble.  Military jets and helicopter gunships were unleashed 
upon people who had no means to defend themselves against assaults from the air. Confronted 
by this brutal repression and a looming humanitarian crisis, I ordered warships into the 
Mediterranean.32 
 
At no point does President Obama use the phrase ‘manifest failing’ yet the underlying 
argument is that what was tolerated yesterday cannot be tolerated today. In other words, the 
escalation in violence in both qualitative and quantitative terms signifies that a line has been 
crossed – a threshold passed - thus implying that the Libyan regime had ‘manifestly failed’. 
Accordingly, Colonel Qaddafi ‘forfeited his responsibility to protect his own citizens and 
created a serious need for immediate humanitarian assistance and protection’.33 In much the 
same way, when one surveys the history of the recent violence in Syria, it is clear that there 
are pivotal qualitative and quantitative developments which led actors to make the case that a 
‘manifest failing’ has occurred.  
 To bring this section to a close it is important to explain the argument put forward 
here. Indeed, the reader may reject the idea of establishing a new research agenda on the 
grounds that it does not matter what phrase is used, the decision to react is a political choice 
based on things other than  ‘manifest failing’, such as the national interest, sovereignty, and 
the complexities of intervention.34 Therefore, we should not get bogged down in a research 
agenda which has no impact on the decision making process and should focus instead on 
issues such as UN reform.35 To be clear, this paper does not argue that aspects such as the 
national interest et al, are not important, and if a reminder of power politics were needed then 
the on-going crisis in Syria is a perfect example. However, the question of what constitutes a 
‘manifest failing’ is another contributing factor because when one analyses the narrative that 
surrounds any R2P crisis one can see a debate over threshold. Whether this is framed in terms 
of illegitimacy, irresponsibility, an escalation in violence, ‘unable or unwilling’, or a 
‘manifest failing’, the underlying logic is that of threshold: a line has been crossed in that 
what was tolerated yesterday cannot be today and action has to be taken. It is a mistake 
therefore to claim that the meaning of ‘manifest failure’ does not matter because this 
perspective fails to recognise that within the current R2P framework it represents the issue of 
threshold. With this in mind, this article now shifts its focus to analysing i) government 
intentions, ii) death toll, iii) displacement of people, iv) the intentional targeting of children, 





As Raymond Hinnebusch explains, within eleven years of Bashar al-Assad assuming power 
in Syria his attempt to ‘modernize authoritarianism’ had collapsed into turmoil.36 Since then, 
the conflict has become more multifaceted needing to be understood within the regional 
context of ‘complex geo-strategic relationships’ which ‘have fed into the decisions within the 
UN Security Council’.37 At the start of 2013 divisions in the Security Council continued as 
U.S. and Russian representatives failed to forge an agreement on what strategy should be 
implemented.38 This forms part of what Paul Rogers labels as a ‘double proxy’ with ‘the 
Saudis supporting the rebels and Iran supporting Assad, overlaid by U.S. support for the 
rebels and Russian support for Assad’.39 This was played out explicitly in the debates that 
followed the use of chemicals in Syria on August 21st 2013. Although there are many factors 
which underpin the broader disagreement on Syria - from Russia’s relationship with Syria 
combined with its opposition of Western intervention and of rebel forces,40 to America’s 
prioritisation of nuclear-talks with Iran41  - the premise of this article is that the [il]legitimacy 
and  [ir]responsibility of the Syrian government is an important issue which, from within an 
R2P framework, asks us to question whether the regime has ‘manifestly failed’? Of course, a 
fundamental problem in any such assessment is evidence as analysts need to distance 
themselves from emotional hysteria and speculative claims. For this very reason, the UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office trained 300 journalists across five Syrian cities so that 
more information could be gained.42 However, 2013 has also seen substantive reports 
published, including the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into Syria, which 
add critical weight to any assessment.43 
 
Government intentions 
When assessing whether a state has ‘manifestly failed’ in its R2P, it is difficult to imagine a 
starting point other than the role of the government itself. Historically, regime type has been a 
key focal point but with a lack of consensus on this issue,44 the R2P framework asks the 
much more straightforward question: to what extent is the government in question 
responsible for the crimes being committed? Analysing the role of state or non-state actors is 
not a straightforward task however as we are faced with the ‘Other Minds problem’ of trying 
to assess the intentions of decision makers when we simply do not know what is going on in 
their minds.45 As Bellamy explains, the explicit statements of intent made by Colonel 
Qaddafi in the lead up to the intervention in Libya should be understood as an exception to 
the norm as the vast majority of leaders hide their objectives and actions.46 To be clear, the 
R2P does not require the international community to prove intent in the same way that the 
1948 Genocide Convention does, but if it can be established that the government in question 
is deliberately facilitating and/or perpetrating any of the four crimes then this is a clear cut 
indicator that a ‘manifest failing’ is taking place.  
Former U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, claimed ‘[w]e will judge Assad's 
sincerity and seriousness by what he does, not by what he says’.47 The statement reflects the 
contemporary trend which invokes a behavioral based (rather than a motive or knowledge 
based) understanding of intent. By this it is meant that Clinton implies that the U.S. will infer 
intent by analyzing the behavior of the regime’s policies. As scholars such as Hebert Hirsch 
and Helen Fein have highlighted, ‘instead of emphasizing an obscure and impossible-to-
define psychological state of intent’48 we should ‘demonstrate “intent” by showing a pattern 
of purposeful action’.49 In other words, since we can never know exactly what is going on in 
the minds of other actors we should focus on state policy. Notably, this approach has traction 
in international law, for as William Schabas explains, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as well as the Darfur Commission carried out their judgements by 
focusing on ‘“plan or policy”’ rather than the mental element of mens rea. 50   
Of course, President Assad maintains his position that the violence used by the state is 
justified on the grounds that rebels pose a threat to the political order.51 This has been 
exacerbated by the number of Islamic extremists entering into Syria; for example, there was 
an estimated 1,500 in August 2012,52 which had doubled to 3,000 by February 2013,53  and 
again to 6,000 by August 2013.54 Brahimi has now spoken of between 30,000 and 40,000 
foreign fighters now in Syria including Hezbollah (supporting Assad) and Al Qaeda (against 
Assad).55 This is complicated even further by reports that the opposition is now made up of 
1,200 groups.56 Yet whilst Syria is undoubtedly a multifaceted crisis with many sides 
responsible for committing a variety of different crimes57, there is a profound imbalance that 
should not be miss-conceptualised. For example, in February 2013, The Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on Syria published its report stating that whilst both 
government and anti-government groups have committed war crimes,‘[t]he violations and 
abuses committed by anti-Government armed groups did not, however, reach the intensity 
and scale of those committed by Government forces and affiliated militia’.58 Moreover, 
‘[g]overnment forces and affiliated militia committed the crimes against humanity of murder, 
torture, rape, enforced disappearance and other inhumane acts’.59 These statements highlight 
that not only is the Syrian regime overwhelming responsibility for the violence carried out 
but at present it is the only actor to have committed war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.60 (Though this may change as more and more evidence comes to light especially as 
there are daily reports of war crimes and crimes against humanity being committed as the 
situation deteriorates even further).  
The role of the state has to play an integral part of any future assessment of ‘manifest 
failing’ and the premise here is that a behavioural-based approach provides a basis for 
assessing to what extent the host state has failed in its R2P. To put this into context, regarding 
Kosovo, the historical policy record of Slobodan Milosevic obviously shaped the decision 
making process whilst Qaddafi’s explicit threats to destroy his own citizens helped create a 
pro-R2P consensus over Libya. However, as perpetrator regimes learn from one another it 
will become more and more difficult to assess the role of the government which means that 
analysts may have to become more dependent on other indicators.   
 
Death toll  
The more people killed the more one would expect that the government is actively 
participating in the violence or is unable to prevent it which aligns itself with the original 
focus on ‘unable or unwilling’. Either way, this may constitute a ‘manifest failing’ depending 
on how many civilians have been killed.  
In Benjamin Valentino’s seminal study on mass violence, the author sets out a clear 
and concise measure ‘at least fifty thousand deaths over the course of five or fewer years’.61 
The reason for this is that it helps demonstrate that a systematic process of mass murder has 
taken place. The arbitrary nature of Valentino’s measurement means that if 49, 999 people 
were killed this would fall short of the classification put forward. Of course, Valentino is 
aware of this, and furthermore, acknowledges that ‘such a definition does not adequately 
capture the threat to human diversity posed by attacks against smaller groups’.62 This has led 
to authors such as Adam Jones to claim that we should not seek to establish a precise 
measurement but acknowledge that ‘tens or hundreds of thousands’ of victims passes a 
threshold but that also we need to factor in ‘relative group size’ which is particularly relevant 
when considering the crime of genocide.63 Essentially, both scholars uphold a ‘tens of 
thousands approach’ with Jones incorporating a qualitative dimension through his focus on 
relative group size. For some analysts this may set the benchmark too high. Alex Bellamy’s 
understanding of mass atrocities is based on an ‘excess of 5,000 civilian deaths and 
demonstrated evidence of deliberate civilian targeting’.64 Although much lower in 
quantifiable terms, Bellamy’s approach still attempts to capture a behavioural-based 
understanding of intent although there is no time-frame incorporated.  
Of course, in relation to Syria, the death toll clearly fulfils any of the above 
approaches. On January 2nd 013, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights commission report was published in which it was claimed that ‘59, 648 unique 
killings’ had taken place within Syria between March 2011 and November 2012.65 It drew 
upon seven data sets and therefore acknowledged that there may be some overlap which 
means that ‘this count may be slightly too high’ but nonetheless, the findings sparked 
worldwide media attention. The reason for this interest, at least in part, reflects the 
aforementioned issue of escalation. For example, responding to the data findings, UN High 
Commissioner Navi Pillay stated ‘[t]he number of casualties is much higher than we 
expected, and is truly shocking’.66 She also pointed out that as the violence in Syria had not 
let-up since the end of November, then logically, the death-toll was in fact even higher in 
January 2013 than the total given in the report. For example, on January 10th UK Foreign 
Secretary William Hague briefed Parliament claiming ‘1,000 civilians were reportedly killed 
in one six-day period over Christmas’.67 Tragically, the killing in 2013 has only escalated 
with ‘most of these casualties believed to be civilians’68, and the current death estimated to be 
115.000 including 47.000 Assad loyalist fighters and 23.000 rebels.69 Although the Syrian 
regime is not responsible for all those killed, and we have no way of knowing exactly who 
has killed who, to juxtapose these statistics with the role of the government analysis above, it 
is important to bear in mind that the regime is overwhelmingly responsible for the number of 
civilians killed. The fact that the Syrian crisis has surpassed even Valentino’s h gh threshold 
does allows us to further substantiate the case that the Syrian regime has ‘manifestly failed’ 
but this does not  overcome the issue of whether a quantifiable death toll indicator should be 
established for future assessments. 
To put these approaches into a practical context consider that the genocide in 
Srebrenica is captured by Bellamy’s measurement but not Valentino’s. This may lead one to 
argue that the fifty thousand threshold is too high but as Bellamy’s approach identifies 103 
episodes of mass atrocity between 1945 and 2010 this could be considered too low. Indeed, if 
this latter measure were accepted the number of cases would give weight to Pape’s claim that 
the ‘R2P sets the bar for intervention so low that virtually every instance of anarchy or 
tyranny-or indeed, every potential instance-represents an opportunity for the international 
community to violate the sovereignty of states’.70 However, this statement is problematic 
because as aforementioned the third pillar of the R2P incorporates more than just military 
intervention and alternative response measures should not be overlooked.71 Furthermore, 
Pape actually claims that ‘mass homicide’ in which ‘thousands have died and thousands more 
are likely to die’ should act as one of the three indicators for a pragmatic intervention, the 
others being a ‘viable plan’ and ‘workable strategy’.72 The trouble here is not Pape’s line of 
thinking but that it is difficult to see why these factors cannot be incorporated into the current 
R2P framework which embodies a long history of prudence and pragmatism.73 
To explain, Pape’s death toll indicator, ‘thousands have died and thousands more 
likely to die’, has notable purchase and can help determine when a ‘manifest failing’s is 
taking place. First, it does not draw an arbitrary quantitative line in the sand in the same way 
that Valentino’s does. Second, it captures the value of Valentino’s approach in that helps us 
demonstrate that a systematic on-going murderous process is taking place which indicates 
that ‘tens of thousands’ may die. Third, it means that we do not have to wait until tens of 
thousands of bodies pile up before a pillar three response can be considered (which is 
precisely what happened in the context of Qaddafi). On that point it is important to note that 
the drafters chose the phrase ‘manifest failing’ rather than ‘manifest failure’ precisely 
because they wanted to highlight this should be identified as a on-going process (manifest 
failing) so that we do not have to wait until the point that the crime is indeed over (manifest 
failure).74 Fourth, it would capture ‘genocidal massacres’ such as Srebrenica whereas 
Valentino and Jones’ approaches would not.75 It is with this in mind that this author upholds 
Pape’s death toll indicator of ‘thousands dead and thousands more likely to die’ as an element 
of pragmatism but claims that this should be incorporated into the current R2P framework 
rather than form the basis of a new approach.  
 
Displacement of people  
To be clear, the R2P was not set up to address the problem of internally displaced people 
(IDP) and refugees. However, if genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or ethnic 
cleansing have been committed, the premise here is that an analysis of IDP and refugees 
helps analysts to gain an understanding of whether the government is ‘manifestly failing’ to 
fulfil both its internal and external responsibilities. It is important to recall that the 
Independent Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) re-characterized 
sovereignty ‘from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal 
functions and external duties’.76 It was claimed that ‘[t]hinking of sovereignty as 
responsibility...implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting 
the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare.77 Accordingly, mass IDP and 
refugee movements help demonstrate that the government is failing in its internal 
responsibility to protect the safety and welfare of citizens as well as its external responsibility 
as refugees destabilise regional order.  
The internal/external dimension was put into context by the Commission of Inquiry into 
Syria as it stated that areas with high number of IDP are particularly prone to hostilities as 
coping mechanisms amongst the population collapse thereby also increasing the number of 
refugees.78 To give an overview, in January 2013, it was estimated that there were two 
million IDP in Syria and ‘an estimated 671, 262 Syrian refugees were present in five 
neighbouring countries and North Africa, further destabilizing the region, both economically 
and politically’.79 Addressing the refugee crisis Melissa Fleming, Chief Spokeswoman for the 
United Nations Refugee Agency claimed ‘it has gone from bad to worse to verging on 
horrific, I mean, what civilians are going through in this conflict is absolutely dramatic….it is 
a very very dramatic situation and has gotten worse’.80 Since this statement was made, the 
number of IDP has risen to an estimated 6 million with 2 million refugees.81 It eems regional 
tensions have surpassed breaking point, for example, on the Turkish Syrian border refugee 
camps are full and security is failing.82 Quite simply, the government has not only failed to 
create a safe security environment domestically but has committed war crimes and crimes 
against humanity which have played major role in escalating the IDP and refugee crisis. In 
relation to this indicator, it seems incomprehensible that anyone would argue that the Syrian 
regime has not ‘manifestly failed’.  
The death toll in any crisis will remain the ‘headline grabber’; however, the displacement 
of people provides another strong indicator because it helps us gauge whether the host state is 
failing in its internal and external responsibilities. The latter is often neglected yet extremely 
important. For example, in relation to the Rwandan genocide the ICISS stated, ‘[i]ts 
consequence was not merely a humanitarian catastrophe for Rwanda: the genocide 
destabilized the entire Great Lakes region and continues to do so’.83 To return to the 
qualitative and quantitative dimension discussed in relation to death toll, one may question 
exactly how many people have to be displaced before we can begin to discuss this in relation 
to a ‘manifest failing’? However, unlike death toll, no refugee crisis is in itself large enough 
to trigger a third pillar action (one of the four crimes would also have to be carried out). The 
intention therefore is to simply highlight that this is another important factor that we should 
incorporate into any judgement of whether the government in question has ‘manifestly 
failed’.  
 
Weapons of choice  
Which weapons are being used to carry out the violence? The answer to this question is 
important as it helps assessments of what the state is doing. Quite simply, if government 
weaponry is being used in systematic manner (rather than a rebel group capturing and using 
some government artillery) then this implies that the government is an active participant in 
the mass violence and is thus obviously failing in its R2P.  
The attack on Homs in February 2012 represented a seismic shift in the violence as the 
city came under siege from heavy weaponry. Comparable thresholds, such as Srebrenica, 
began to be used in the discourse as analysts claimed that the violence equalled unacceptable 
levels.84 In June 2012, Sausan Ghosheh, the spokesperson for the UN Supervision Mission in 
Syria, stated that UN observers in Homs ‘reported heavy fighting in Rastan and Talbiseh, 
north of the city, with artillery and mortar shelling, as well as firing from helicopters, 
machine guns and smaller arms’.85 The statement captures two key components in any 
assessment as it draws attention to the disproportional escalation in violence and the role of 
the government. Both of which became even more prominent with the use of scud missiles.86 
Whilst anti-Government armed groups have also used anti-tank and anti-air craft missiles, it 
is important to stress that these are limited in ‘quality and quantity’.87 This reaffirms the idea 
that the Syrian government bears overwhelming responsibility precisely because it was 
government weaponry that was used.  
Long rumored reports on the potential use of chemical weapons became more 
prominent as the government’s control weakened.88 In a Chatham House publication in 
January 2013, Steve Clemons touched on many key issues here when he stated:  
 
The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime would be likely to generat  conditions of 
regional and global support for intervention. But if the regime does not deploy chemical 
weapons, then the United States and other countries in the region are not likely to intervene 
robustly.89  
 
Even though Syria is just one of six states to have not ratified the 1993 Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, the 
statement highlights that the use of chemical weapons may constitute a tipping point in the 
Syrian crisis. This was put into sharp context in March 2013 as reports that the Syrian regime 
had in fact used chemical weapons came to light. This led President Obama to claim ‘[o]nce 
we establish the facts, I have made clear that the use of chemical weapons is a game changer’ 
which led to a heated debate over whether a ‘red-line’ had been crossed.90 
 
 
Of course, we now know that the chemical weapon attacks conducted on August 21st 2013 – 
which the West claimed were carried out by the Syria regime – did not lead to military 
strikes. Nevertheless, the statement rightly captures the qualitative dimension that surrounds 
the use of chemical weapons. Despite the fact that an estimated 100.000 people had been 
killed by conventional weapons, chemical weapons were interpreted as a ‘qualitative leap’ in 
the violence. Whether this is right or wrong is a separate issue. From an analytical 
perspective, the example draws attention to the central idea of threshold and that the weapons 
used have been factored in to calculations of a ‘manifest failing’ in Syria. 
The focus on heavy weaponry in Syria is understandable but whether weaponry can 
be used as a comparative indicator is problematic. For example, in the Rwandan genocide in 
1994, an estimated 37.9% of victims were killed by machetes and further 19.8% by clubs.91 
Historically therefore, mass atrocities have been carried out without the use of heavy 
weaponry. At the same time however, Linda Melvern highlights that the Rwandan 
government played an integral role in ‘arming the country’ as ‘US$725.669’ was spent 
importing new machetes in 1993 so that ‘there was an estimated one new machete for every 
third male in the country’.92 This brings us back to the point that the weapons used - in the 
case of Rwanda not just type but also quantity - help us understand what the government is 
doing and what it is not doing. Further research on this is required yet the heavy weaponry in 
the Syrian crisis juxtaposed with the light weaponry in the Rwandan genocide begin to 
illustrate that the weapons used in a conflict may have substantial purchase when attempting 
to demonstrate that a ‘manifest failing’ is taking place.  
 
Targeting civilians: especially women, children and the elderly  
The systematic targeting of civilians implies that a policy has been forged. Accordingly the 
government is either responsible for the plan being formulated or is incapable of preventing 
non-state actors from implementing this strategy. Either way, a substantive case can be made 
that the host state is ‘manifestly failing’ in its R2P but the premise here is that this failing is 
most obvious when vulnerable groups are targeted. In Jacques Sémelin’s accomplished 
analysis on the dynamics of mass murder the author claims that ‘[a] considerable qualitative 
leap is taken when the target widens to include, women, children, and elderly people’.93 The 
point is not to downplay attacks on other civilians but to highlight that the gravity and 
character of the crime takes on another qualitative dimension when vulnerable groups are 
targeted. This is not to suggest that such groups should be viewed as passive actors that have 
no agency but instead to highlight that certain groups are more vulnerable in war than 
others.94 Therefore, when the host state fails to protect these groups, or if it is the perpetrator 
itself, then it is difficult to conceive of a clearer indicator of a ‘manifest failing’, especially in 
relation to the targeting of children. 
In Syria, the high number of children killed stems from a lethal cocktail of intentional 
targeting, indiscriminate killing, and the destruction of healthcare provisions. It is important 
to bear in mind that ‘the escalation point for the uprising in Syria was the arrest and torture of 
fifteen school children for spray painting anti-government graffiti on a wall in Daraa’.95 This 
was followed by reports that ‘[a]s of 26 February 2012, 599 children had purportedly been 
killed’.96 This led to the organization War Child publishing a twenty-four page report 
entitled, ‘Syria: War on Childhood’ in which it was claimed that up to 1500 has been killed 
by July 2012.97 By October, estimates reached over 2000 children dead.98 Of course, there are 
real difficulties in substantiating the accusation that such groups are being systematically 
targeted. Leila Zerrougui, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children 
and Armed Conflict, acknowledged that violence has been committed ‘against civilians and 
children’ but stated that the UN needed better access in order to establish whether ‘we can 
say that it’s a weapon of war used to target specifically children or if it is an indiscriminate 
use of violence that affect children including civilians’.99 In other words, is it that the Syrian 
regime is intentionally targeting children or is it more than they simply do not care if children 
die as part of the mass violence?  
In March 2012, Pillay claimed ‘[t]hey’ve [government forces] gone for the children – 
for whatever purposes – in large numbers. Hundreds detained and tortured... it’s just 
horrendous’.100 Since then reports of the Syrian regime using children as human shields has 
led to the claim of genocide being raised.101 More recently, the Independent Commission of 
Inquiry validated examples of ‘government forces executing women, children, and the 
elderly’.102 Furthermore, in February 2013, the Syrian government launched ballistic missiles 
into a town in Aleppo which killed 141 people including 71 children. Responding to this, 
Philipe Bolopion, UN Director of Human Rights Watch, stated ‘either the government is 
deliberately targeting civilians or it is acting with complete disregard for the lives of 
civilians’.103 The examples give weight to the fact that the high death toll amongst children is 
a mixture of indiscriminate killing as well as intentional targeting; however, there is a third 
dimension as a Save the Children report published in March 2013 drew attention to the 
particularly vulnerability of children from the spread of disease.104 Juxtaposed with this is the 
fact that ‘more than half of Syria’s hospitals have been damaged, and nearly a third have been 
put completely out of action’.105 For instance, in Aleppo it is estimated that ‘two-thirds of 
hospitals are no longer functioning....and the number of medics practising in and around 
Aleppo has fallen from 5,000 to just 36.’106 The examples underline the tragic tripartite of 
reasons which explain the high death toll amongst children.  
 Although the civilian focus is enough to warrant a ‘manifest failing’, to return to 
Sémelin, this author agrees that we should pay attention to the targeting of vulnerable groups 
when assessing the [ir]responsibility of the host state. It may be the case that the high number 
of child soldiers in post-Cold War conflicts complicates the picture and at the very least 
highlights that children, like women and the elderly, should not be written off as passive 
agents. Having acknowledged this however, it is important to recognize that children are 
‘manipulated by those in power, forgotten by many international organizations, and rarely 
included in key decision-making bodies of peace efforts’ and thus, further research on the 




This article has analysed the discourse on Syria and drawn on interdisciplinary research in to 
mass violence in order to identify five key indicators f a ‘manifest failing’: i) government 
intentions, ii) weapons used, iii) death toll, iv) number of people displaced, and v) the 
intentional targeting of civilians, especially women, children and the elderly. When one 
begins to put these five jig saw pieces together one can at least begin to make sense of, and 
substantiate, the idea that the Syrian regime has ‘manifestly failed’ in its R2P. Although anti-
government forces should also be held account, it is evident that the Syrian regime bears 
overwhelming responsibility for the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed 
which has seen an estimated 115.000 people killed, a third of the country displaced, and 
widespread indiscriminate killing of civilians including children. Although voices calling for 
a third pillar response have been around since at least February 2012,108 this author would 
argue that there is now an irrefutable body of evidence that can be put forward in order to 
demonstrate that the Syrian regime has ‘manifestly failed’. The worrying complexity is that 
without such evidence we cannot prove a ‘manifest failing’ has taken place. Undoubtedly, 
this raises the troubling reality that a pillar three action, such as a humanitarian intervention, 
may be most effective if it is conducted earlier rather than later.109 But with very little 
consensus on this issue the R2P process as it stands means that the international community 
has to first agree on and then react to a ‘manifest failing’. 
Of course, there are never going to be criteria which will allow analysts to 
scientifically pinpoint the precise moment at which a ‘manifest failing’ occurs. Moreover, a 
level of flexibility is needed so that the rules do not become too rigid for practical use on a 
case by case basis. However, to return to the logic that underpins Just War Theory, the 
intention here is to provide a ‘common reference within which argumentation can take place’ 
for at present there is none.110 The hope is that through further research a more 
comprehensive framework can be established which aids the assessment of other case studies. 
Future research needs to address questions and issues which could not be factored in to this 
article. In particular, the idea of scaling needs to be addressed. This author’s position is that 
not all five indicators have to be present for a ‘manifest failing’ to take place, for example, 
the displacement of people is less important than death toll or government intentions. 
Furthermore, there may be other indicators, for example, systematic sexual violence, which 
may be incorporated as comparative studies are done, and interdisciplinary perspectives put 
forward. Finally, there are quantitative and qualitative dimensions embodied in these five 
indicators which need to be brought to the fore, again, interdisciplinary research will help 
here. But at the very least, the five indicators provide a framework to aid further debate and 
analysis. When one considers that the lives of potentially millions of people may depend on 
the third pillar of the R2P being triggered, the importance of this issue cannot be overstated. 
Indeed, as the crisis in Syria continues to escalate this gives further credence to the idea that 
an independent body should be set up to make rulings on such issues,111 a part of which has 
to be whether a ‘manifest failing’ is taking place.  
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